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Non-technical summary:
In this paper, we propose a solution for the fair division of common property resources that
supplements the Walrasian solution by lump-sum wealth transfers to assure the adherence of
welfare bounds, whose ethical justification rests on commonality of ownership. We apply this
Bounded Walrasian Solution (BWS) to the question of burden sharing in the climate change
regime using an intertemporal computable general equilibrium model. For a wide range of
initial allocations of CO2 emission rights we find that developing countries should fully
participate in emission reduction efforts to increase global efficiency of carbon abatement, but
should also be fully compensated for the associated costs. At the same time, BWS reduces
emission abatement costs for industrialized countries, which would be moderate even for an
instantaneous equal per capital allocation of emission rights.
Our simulations show that the fair division of the gains from exchanging entitlements to the
global carbon resource has welfare implications that are as important as the initial allocation
of entitlement itself. For rather controversial initial entitlement rules, BWS leads to very
similar welfare pattern. This indicates that the importance of the entitlement allocation may
actually have been overemphasized as compared to the allocation of the gains from
exchanging these entitlement. If one agrees that the ethical judgement that underlie BWS are
less controversial than the fair allocation of initial entitlements, this might actually help to
facilitate the conflict on burden sharing in climate change negotiations.
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Abstract
This paper introduces a solution for the fair division of common property
resources in production economies with multiple inputs and outputs. It is de-
rived from complementing the Walrasian solution by welfare bounds, whose
ethical justification rests on commonality of ownership. We then apply this
solution to the question of burden sharing in the climate change regime, using
an intertemporal computable general equilibrium model. For a wide range
of initial allocations of CO2 emission rights, we find that developing coun-
tries should participate in emission reduction efforts in order to increase their
global efficiency, but should also be fully compensated for their incremental
abatement costs.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the fair division of an unproduced commodity that is the
common property of a group of agents. We formulate welfare bounds for fair division
which take account of general equilibrium effects. These criteria are then applied
to the fair division of emission abatement burdens in the climate change regime.
We show that essentially the same abatement cost pattern may emerge for different
initial allocations of emission rights.
The fair division literature usually focuses on economies that are restricted to
those goods that must be divided fairly (see Moulin 1995 for an introduction). Often,
this is appropriate: if we analyze the classical problem of fairly dividing a cake, for
instance, we do not have to worry about the rest of the economy. However, there are
problems for which such an approach is less suitable, because the allocation of the
commodities to be divided fairly – called ‘fair division commodities’ in the following
– has significant spillover effects to other commodity markets that will also affect
agents’ welfare. A pertinent example is the allocation of emission abatement cost in
the climate change regime.
In the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries as listed in Annex B of the Proto-
col agreed to reduce their 1990 emissions of greenhouse gases by an average of 5.2 per
cent during the commitment period 2008-2012. However, there has been widespread
consensus that much higher emission reductions will be required in the long run in
order to avoid substantial increases in the global mean temperature (Metz, David-
son, Swart, and Pan 2001). Given the potential magnitude of economic adjustment
costs induced by stringent global emission constraints, questions of burden sharing
will receive increased attention.
For example, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, passed 95 to 0 votes in the U.S. Senate
in 1997, states that “the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol that
excludes developing countries from legally binding commitments.”1 In March 2001,
this position was reinforced by U.S. President George W. Bush, who characterized
the Kyoto Protocol as ‘fatally flawed’ and refused to ratify it. Developing countries,
on their part, have argued that they carry only minor historical responsibility for the
increase in global CO2 concentrations. Therefore, industrialized countries should go
ahead with climate protection measures.
How, then, should emission reduction burdens be allocated? In the following, we
shall address this question from the normative perspective of fair division theory,
which is based on ordinal preference relations and requires neither cardinal nor
interpersonal comparability.
As Moulin (1991, 326) states, “the normative literature on (ordinal) fair divi-
1The Byrd-Hagel Resolution, U.S. Senate, 12 June 1997, 105th Congress, 1st Session, Senate
Resolution 98.
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sion argues almost unanimously in favor of the competitive equilibrium from equal
split”. This solution satisfies a number equity principles such as individual rational-
ity and envy-freeness for a wide range of problems (Moulin 1990; Young 1994). Not
surprisingly, the competitive (or Walrasian) equilibrium also obtains a prominent
position in the debate on how to allocate greenhouse gas abatement costs (for a
survey see Rose, Stevens, Edmonds, and Wise 1998). More so, Article 17 of the
Kyoto-Protocol actually provides for the trading of emission rights, at least among
Annex I countries.
Nevertheless, the Walrasian equilibrium has some normative defects if applied to
the fair division of common property resources. In particular, common ownership
intuitively suggests that one should share the benefits of the resource with the co-
owners. This idea of solidarity may be violated by the Walrasian equilibrium, which
may even give some agents a share that they value more (utilitywise) than the whole
common resource (Moulin 1991).
Despite this critique of the Walrasian equilibrium, no clearly superior candidate
has emerged. One reason is that a number of desirable fair division criteria have been
shown to be incompatible for any division mechanism (e.g., Moulin 1990; Moulin
1995). In this paper, therefore, we will use the Walrasian equilibrium as a starting
point. However, we will supplement it with welfare bounds so as to improve its nor-
mative appeal. Accordingly, we name our proposal for the fair division of common
property resources “Bounded Walrasian Solution”.
If applied to climate change, it has some interesting implications. In particular,
the most cited argument against allocating tradable emission rights on an equal per
capita basis is the potentially large welfare transfers from developed to developing
countries. This is avoided by the bounded Walrasian solution. For a wide range of
initial allocations of emission rights – including an equal per capita allocation –, it
essentially leads to a solution where developing countries are fully compensated for
their emission abatement efforts, but do not receive any further transfers.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss utility bounds for fair
division in economies with multiple inputs and outputs. These will form the basis
for the bounded Walrasian solution, which we apply to the allocation of emission
abatement burdens in the climate change regime. In Section 3 we explain the basic
characteristics of our computable general equilibrium model, and continue in Section
4 with the implementation of the bounded Walrasian solution. Section 5 presents
the main results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Utility bounds in fair division
Consider an exchange economy in which each agent is initially endowed with an equal
per capita share of a common property resource. If exchanges are governed by the
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Walrasian solution, then the utility of individual agents has no finite upper bound
(Moulin 1991, 326). For example, if there is one agent with ‘eccentric’ preferences
surrounded by a large number of agents of equal type, then the eccentric agent may
keep all the surplus of exchanging the initial endowment – and this surplus may
tend towards infinity.
Similarly, with tradable CO2 emission rights, some countries may obtain an
income from permit sales that substantially exceeds their emission abatement costs.
One may ask ‘so what?’. After all, it is quite common that agents achieve a high
income for goods that are heavily sought after. However, we are concerned not with
ordinary private goods, but with goods that are the common property of several
agents. Having an equal per capita entitlement to them is quite a different thing
from equal per capita property rights. In the latter case, there would no longer be a
common resource.
John Locke (1632 – 1704) argued that the maximum utility that can be obtained
from a common resource should be one that arises from one’s own usage of the
resource, but not from selling shares of it. Starting with the idea that nature in its
original state is common property that was given equally by God to all men to be
worked and appropriated by them, he writes:
“God has given us all things richly”, is the voice of reason confirmed by
inspiration. But how far has he given it to us? To enjoy. As much as
any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much
he may by his labour fix a property in; whatever is beyond this is more
than his share, and belongs to others. (Locke 1963)
More recently, Moulin (1992, 1333) has argued in similar spirit that “fair division
conveys the idea of no subsidization: the presence of other agents who are willing
to pay higher monetary transfers than me for consuming the resources should not
turn to my advantage.” This argument seems particularly justified if the willingness
to pay higher monetary transfers is related to efforts to solve a problem that affects
all agents – such as climate change.
These are the normative ideas that underlie the stand-alone upper bound. In an
exchange economy that is restricted to the fair division commodities, it is defined
as an agent’s utility if he alone consumes the whole common resource (Moulin 1991;
Moulin 1992).2 However, in a general equilibrium framework, an agent’s utility
depends not only on his own use of the common resource, but also on induced
adjustments of other agents. For example, an agent may derive little or even no
utility from his consumption of a resource, but still benefit via general equilibrium
effects from other agents’ consumption of it. In this case, the scenario in which he
alone consumes the common resource is questionable as an upper bound.
2It is common to assume free disposal.
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To take account of these considerations, we propose to define the upper bound
as the highest utility that an agent can attain if he has the right to determine the
initial allocation of the common resource. We call this the dictatorial upper bound.
Accordingly, the agent may allocate some of the common resource to other agents
so as to benefit from the general equilibrium feedback of spillover effects. However,
according to the above ideas, he may not charge for that. Note that in a partial
equilibrium framework, this definition coincides with the standard stand-alone upper
bound.
To formalize this idea, we consider an economy with I agents, J firms and L
commodities. Each agent i = 1, . . . , I has rational, continuous, strongly monotone,
and convex preferences that are defined on his closed and convex consumption set
Xi ⊂ RL. We assume that preferences admit a numerical representation through
a concave utility function ui : Xi → R, and normalize ui(0) = 0. Each agent i’s
vector of initial endowments ωi = (ωi1, . . . , ωiL) ∈ RL can be partitioned into two
groups. The first group, indexed l = 1, . . . ,M , are unproduced commodities that
are to be divided fairly. They can be consumed or used as an input into production.
Hence M ≥ 1 represents the number of fair division commodities. The second
group comprises the other (produced or unproduced) private commodities, which
are indexed l = M + 1, . . . , L.
Each firm j = 1, . . . , J is characterized by a non-empty, closed and convex pro-
duction set Yj ⊂ RL that satisfies the free-disposal property. Profits of firms accrue
to the agents as the stakeholders. Denote by θij ∈ [0, 1] an agent i’s ownership
share in firm j, and let θi = (θi1, . . . , θiJ) ∈ RJ . Accordingly,
∑
i θi is the unit
vector. Thus, we can summarize the mixed private-common ownership economy by
E = ({Xi, ui}Ii=1, {Yj}Jj=1, {ωi}Ii=1, {θi}Ii=1).
An allocation (x, y) = (x1, . . . , xI , y1, . . . , yJ) is a specification of a consumption
vector xi = (xi1, . . . , xiL) ∈ Xi for each consumer and a production vector yj =
(yj1, . . . , yjL) ∈ Yj for each firm defined over the L commodities. The set of feasible
allocations A = {(x, y) :∑Ii=1 xi =∑Jj=1 yj +∑Ii=1 ωi} is assumed to be nonempty
and compact. A solution is a correspondence F that associates with every economy
E a subset of feasible allocations (x, y) ∈ F (E).
Definition 1 Let xFk denote an agent k’s consumption vector induced by a solution
F (E), let p = (p1, . . . , pL) be a price vector, and superscripts ∗ indicate equilibrium
levels. Furthermore, denote an agent k’s choice of another agent i’s endowment
with the fair division commodities by ωki = (ω
k
il)
M
l=1 ∈ RM . A solution F satisfies
the dictatorial upper bound if for each agent k, k = 1, . . . , I, and every economy
E : uk(xFk ) ≤ uDk (x∗k), where
uDk (x
∗
k) = max{(ωki )Ii=1}
{uk(x∗k)} such that (1)
py∗j ≥ pyj ∀ yj ∈ Yj,∀ j = 1, . . . , J. (2)
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ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui(xi) ∀xi ∈ Bi,∀ i = 1, . . . , I,
Bi =
{
xi ∈ Xi : pxi ≤ pωi +
J∑
j=1
θijpy
∗
j
}
. (3)
I∑
i=1
(x∗il)
L
l=M+1 −
J∑
j=1
(y∗jl)
L
l=M+1 =
I∑
i=1
(ωil)
L
l=M+1. (4)
(x∗il)
M
l=1 −
J∑
j=1
θij(y
∗
jl)
M
l=1 ≤ (ωkil)Ml=1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , I. (5)
Conditions (2) to (4) are the standard requirements for a Walrasian equilibrium
of profit maximization, utility maximization subject to the budget constraint, and
market clearing. More precisely, an allocation (x∗, y∗) and a price vector p would
constitute a Walrasian equilibrium if they satisfied conditions (2) and (3) subject to∑I
i=1 x
∗
i =
∑J
j=1 y
∗
j +
∑I
i=1 ωi. We denote the Walrasian allocation for later reference
by (xW , yW ).
The crucial expression for the dictatorial upper bound is (5). It states that an
agent i’s consumption of the fair division commodities and their use as an input into
production – calculated as firms’ input of the fair division commodities weighted by
i’s ownership shares – may not exceed the initial endowment as determined by agent
k. Hence, the fair division commodities are exempted from Walrasian trading.
The dictatorial upper bound reflects that fair division problems are often framed
as ‘manna falling from heaven’ that has to be divided fairly. Accordingly, there is
something to allocate that has not been consumed previously. For environmental
problems, however, the usual scenario is that a common resource has been overused
because it was considered a free resource, and now its usage for consumption and
production must be restricted. Therefore, the original unrestricted usage of the com-
mon resource is a further upper bound candidate. We call this the free access upper
bound. Applied to climate change, this coincides with the business-as-usual scenario
without any explicit emission reduction measures. Hence, the free access upper
bound assures that no country benefits at the expense of other countries’ emission
reduction burdens, again reflecting the solidarity ideal inherent in fair division.
The main shortcoming of the free access upper bound is that it includes the
benefits from an overuse of the common resource in the free access scenario – both
direct ones from its domestic use and indirect ones via spillover effects of its use by
other agents. If the overuse and the associated benefits are very high, then the free
access upper bound may also be excessively high. Therefore, it would be of little
guidance for fairly dividing a resource that is small compared to its usage in the free
access scenario. However, for the emission scenarios that we consider later on, this
is not the case.
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Besides upper bounds, also lower bounds have always played a prominent role in
fair division theory. Actually, the oldest fair division axiom belongs to this category:
Steinhaus’ (1948) criterion of individual rationality that each agent should be guar-
anteed at least the utility from consuming his entitlement to a common resource.
In a mixed private-common ownership economy with general equilibrium effects,
however, this criterion is not well defined because an agent’s utility from consuming
his entitlement to a common resource depends on the behavior of the other agents.
One possibility would be to impose certain assumptions with respect to this be-
havior. For example, one could define the lower bound as the utility that arises if all
agents use their entitlement to the common resource for their own consumption and
production. One may ask, however, why an agent should be entitled to gains that
may arise via general equilibrium effects from the other agents’ waiver to trade their
initial entitlements. Similar objections could be raised against any other assumption
about the behavior of the other agents.3
For this reason, we abstain from formulating an explicit lower bound. However,
the following proposition shows that there exists a solution which assures those
agents who do not receive their upper bound utility at least their utility at the
Walrasian equilibrium. Implicitly, therefore, we have incorporated a lower bound,
even though it has not been derived from explicit normative principles. Note also
that a lower bound that gives every agent more than his utility at the Walrasian
equilibrium could never be satisfied.
Proposition 1 Let (uUB1 , . . . , u
UB
I ) be a (non-feasible) profile of utility upper bounds.
There exists a Pareto efficient allocation (x, y) that satisfies the utility upper bound
and that assures every agent who does not receive his utility upper bound at least his
utility at the Walrasian equilibrium, i.e.
∃ (x, y) : ui(x) ≤ uUBi and ui(x) ≥ min{uUBi , ui(xW )}, i = 1, . . . , I.
Proof. We define by S = {i, i = 1, . . . , I : ui(xWi ) > uUPi } the set of agents
whose Walrasian utility exceeds their utility upper bound. Furthermore, we denote
by U = {(u1, . . . , uI) ∈ RI : there exists a feasible allocation (x, y) such that ui ≤
ui(xi), i = 1, . . . , I} the utility possibility set, and by UP = {(u1, . . . , uI) ∈ U :
there is no (u′1, . . . , u
′
I) ∈ U such that u′i ≥ ui for all i and u′i > ui for some i} the
Pareto frontier of U .
Since the Walrasian allocation (xW , yW ) is Pareto efficient by the First Funda-
mental Theorem of Welfare Economics, (u1(x
W
1 ), . . . , uI(x
W
I )) ∈ UP . Let (uˆ1, . . . , uˆI)
be a utility profile such that uˆi = u
UB
i for all i ∈ S and uˆi = uWi for all i /∈ S. By
definition of set S, (uˆ1, . . . , uˆI) ∈ U \ UP if S 	= ∅. Geometrically, we simply move
3Note the contrast to the dictatorial upper bound, where the agent under consideration dictates
the other agents allocation of the fair division commodities.
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into the interior of the utility possibility set by reducing the utility of agents i ∈ S to
levels uUBi , while holding the other agents utility fixed at ui(x
W
i ). Our assumptions
on preferences assure that U is closed and bounded above. Hence, by continuity of
preferences, there obviously exists a feasible utility vector on the boundary of the
utility possibility set such that ui = uˆi for all i ∈ S and ui ≥ uˆi for all i /∈ S. Finally,
with strongly monotonic preferences, any such solution is Pareto efficient. 
In Section 4, we will propose a specific way of moving from the utility profile
(uˆ1, . . . , uˆI) to the Pareto frontier, which is essentially by giving all agents i /∈ S
equal lump-sum transfers. However, in the next section we will first introduce the
computable general equilibrium model that we use for the empirical analysis of
carbon dioxide abatement.
3 A computable general equilibrium model for
the analysis of carbon dioxide abatement
Our multi-sector, multi region model of the world economy features 10 regions which
are linked through bilateral trade flows. The spatial aggregation covers regions
that are central to the greenhouse gas policy debate (see Table 1). The sectors
have been chosen so as to capture key dimensions in the analysis of abatement of
carbon dioxide (as the most important greenhouse gas) such as differences in carbon
intensities across fossil fuels and the substitutability across energy goods and non-
energy goods.
In particular, the economic structure of each region consists of 4 production
sectors: one non-energy macro good sector and three fossil fuel sectors (coal, crude
oil and natural gas). Their outputs are demanded by intermediate production,
exports, investment and a representative consumer. More specifically, this economic
structure represents the economy as introduced in Section 2, where the I agents are
Table 1: Overview of regions
Label Long name Label Long name
AFR Sub-Saharan Africa CHN China
IDI India LAM Latin America and the Caribbean
MEA Middle East and North Africa NAM North America (USA and Canada)
PAO Pacific OECD (Japan, PAS Other Pacific Asia
Australia, New Zealand)
REC Reforming economy countries WEU Western Europe
(newly independent states
of the former Soviet Union,
Central and Eastern Europe)
8
given as representative consumers in each region, and the J firms are captured as
production sectors. Furthermore, the L commodities consist of primary production
factors capital and labor, the outputs by the production sectors, and carbon dioxide
– the fair division commodity – which is associated with the use of fossil energy in
intermediate production and final consumption.
The issue of long-term carbon abatement requires the addition of a dynamic
component. Only an intertemporal model setting with markets linked through time
provides the appropriate framework for capturing the long-term impacts of policy
measures on savings and investments, i.e. future capital stocks. Below, we provide
a non-technical description.4
Producers and representative consumers behave according to the competitive
paradigm, in the sense that they take market prices as given. Their consumption
and investment decisions are based on rational point expectations of future prices,
thus we assume ‘perfect foresight’ (see Manne and Richels (1992) for a discussion).
Entrepreneurs choose investment in order to maximize the present value of their
firms. In each region, production of the non-energy macro good is captured by an
aggregate production function which characterizes technology through transforma-
tion possibilities on the output side (between production for domestic and export
markets) and substitution possibilities on the input side (between alternative combi-
nations of inputs). On the output side, production is split between goods produced
for domestic markets and goods produced for export markets subject to a constant
elasticity of transformation. On the input side, capital, labor and an energy ag-
gregate of fossil fuels trade off with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES).
Production of the energy aggregate is described by a CES function which reflects
substitution possibilities for different fossil fuels (i.e. coal, gas, and oil). Fossil fuels
are produced from fuel-specific resources and the non-energy macro good subject to
a CES technology.
The representative household in each region chooses to allocate lifetime income
across consumption in different time periods in order to maximize lifetime utility.
In each period, households face the choice between current consumption and future
consumption, which can be purchased via savings. The trade-off between current
consumption and savings is given by a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion. Households demand an aggregate consumption good which is a CES composite
of the non-energy macro good and a household-specific energy aggregate.
Output is divided between consumption (incl. exports and intermediate demand)
and investment, which augments the (depreciated) capital stock in the next period.
Investment takes place until its marginal returns equal the marginal cost of capital
formation. These rates of return are determined by a uniform and endogenous
4The algebraic formulation of the generic intertemporal model can be downloaded from
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/div/fair.pdf.
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world interest rate such that the marginal productivity of a unit of investment and
marginal utility of a unit of consumption is equalized within and across countries.
Following Armington (1969), domestic, imported and exported varieties of the
non-energy goods are distinguished by origin. The Armington aggregation function
provides a constant elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported vari-
eties of the non-energy good for all buyers in the domestic market. With respect to
trade in energy, fossil fuels from different regions are treated as perfect substitutes,
which implies that we use net trade data with no cross-hauling. International capital
flows reflect borrowing and lending at the world interest rate, and are endogenous
subject to an intertemporal balance of payments constraint: there is no change in
net indebtedness over the entire model horizon.
Finally, there are backstop technologies in each region for producing the indus-
trial energy aggregate and the household energy aggregate. The backstop technology
defines the price for a carbon-free energy source in infinite supply (e.g. photovoltaic,
fuel cells) and provides an upper limit on the marginal costs of reducing carbon emis-
sions. The backstops are produced in each region through the employment of the
region’s non-energy macro good.
Data from two different sources are combined to calibrate parameters of the func-
tional forms from a given set of quantities, prices and elasticities. The first source is
the GTAP database (McDougall, Elbehri, and Truong 1998), which includes detailed
input-output tables for 45 regions and 50 sectors as well as a world trade matrix with
bilateral trade flows for all sectors and regions. The other source is the IEA energy
statistics (International Energy Agency 1996) that provide physical energy flows and
energy prices for industrial and household demands. Reconciliation of these data
sources involves replacement of GTAP’s aggregate input-output monetary values for
energy supply and demand with physical energy flows and energy prices as given in
the IEA’s energy statistics (Rutherford and Paltsev 2000). The major advantage of
doing so is that implicit marginal abatement cost curves for carbon emissions, and
hence the cost evaluation of carbon emission constraints, are based on real energy
flows rather than aggregate monetary data. This strengthens the credibility of the
quantitative results.
For the baseline calibration of our multi-region dynamic CGE model we incor-
porate IIASA/WEC projections on the future development of GDP and fossil fuel
production for the 21st century differentiated by countries (IIASA 1998). Table 2
summarizes the central values for key elasticities employed for the core simulations.
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Table 2: Overview of key elasticities
Type of elasticity Description Central Value
Armington elasticity Degree of substitutability
of substitution • Between macro imports
from different regions 2
• Between the import aggregate
and the domestically 1
produced macro good
Armington elasticity Degree of substitutability between
of transformation macro good produced for the
domestic market and macro good 2
destined for the export market
Price elasticity of Degree of response of 1 (coal),
fossil fuel supply international fossil fuel supply to 4 (gas),
changes in fossil fuel price 8 (oil)
Elasticity of substitution This value increases linearly over
between non-energy and time to reflect empirical 0.2 (short run: 2000)
energy composite in production evidence on differences between
and final demand short-run and long-run 0.8 (long run: 2050)
adjustment costs (Lindbeck 1983)
Interfuel elasticity Degree of substitutability between 0.5 (final demand)
of substitution fossil fuels (fuel switching) 2a, 1b (industry)
a between oil and gas, b between coal and the oil-gas aggregate
4 The bounded Walrasian solution to carbon diox-
ide abatement
In the introduction, we mentioned the widespread support that the Walrasian so-
lution has received in the literature on (ordinal) fair division. However, we also
pointed out some of its normative defects. To take them at least partly into ac-
count, we proposed to supplement the Walrasian solution with an upper bound on
each individual agent’s utility.
In particular, we suggested that potential violaters of their upper bound utility
should receive precisely this upper bound utility. For the other agents, we showed
that there are usually many Pareto efficient solutions that give them a utility between
their utility at the Walrasian equilibrium and their upper bound utility. As our
analysis is exclusively driven by fairness issues, it is natural to treat these agents in
an equal way. Still, this leaves open the question of how to actually operationalize
the idea of equal treatment. Here, we follow the resourcist approach (Dworkin 1981)
by giving these agents equal lump-sum wealth transfers, subject to the constraint
that these transfers do not lift them above their utility upper bound.
In particular, the constraint implementing the upper utility bound is
ui ≤ uUBi ⊥ mi, (6)
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where uUBi is the upper bound intertemporal welfare index for region i, ui is the
intertemporal welfare index for region i, and mi is the complementary endogenous
(intertemporal) payment of region i to keep welfare below upper bound levels. If a
region’s welfare increases above the level of the upper bound, the constraint binds
which implies that mi is no longer zero. The induced transfers of regions with a
binding upper bound are used for compensation of other regions on an equal per
capita basis (with populations being weighted over time).
For the specific case of climate change, the free access upper bound seems to
better reflect the typical framing of the problem and ongoing political discussions
than the dictatorial upper bound. In addition, we show that the main defect of the
free access upper bound – excessively high upper bounds – is of minor relevance in
our empirical example. Therefore, we implement the free access upper bound in our
simulations. This restricts the individual region’s welfare by the scenario without
any explicit emission reduction measures.5
Furthermore, the application of this bounded Walrasian solution to climate
change requires the preceding specification of entitlements to carbon dioxide emis-
sions, i.e. of ωi1. The proposals range from equal (historical) per capita entitlements
(see Kverndokk 1995) to an allocation in proportion to current emission patterns.
Another common proposal is to use multiple criteria – such as GDP, historical emis-
sions and population – and to weigh them such that indicators expressing the status
quo are emphasized initially, while those that are perceived as more fair become
increasingly important in the course of time (e.g., Cline 1992, 353). We abstain
from discussing the ethical aspects of these divergent views (see Helm and Simonis
2001). However, we show below that the effect of applying a fair division solution –
like the bounded Walrasian solution – may actually dominate the effect of different
entitlement specifications.
For the sake of parsimony, we restrict our policy simulations to two prominent
entitlement allocations. The first one is gradual convergence (COV) of entitlements
from current emission patterns to an equal per capita division of the desired target
level in the target year (Grubb and Sebenius 1992). To define the target year, we
assume that global carbon emissions are to be reduced by 25 per cent in 2050 relative
to their 1990 level. This coincides with recent requests by the International Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) for long-term abatement requirements (Metz, Davidson,
Swart, and Pan 2001).
More specifically, per capita emission rights of country i in year t are a weighted
average of per capita emissions in 2000, denoted ωi1(2000) and the uniform per
capita emission rights in 2050, denoted ωi1(2050):
5Furthermore, implementation of the dictatorial upper bound would require to formulate the
general equilibrium model (formally defined as systems of weak inequalities) as an explicit math-
ematical program subject to equilibrium constraints (MPEC). This may cause severe numerical
solving problems for large-scale models (Luo, Pang, and Ralph 1996).
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Table 3: HEV in lifetime income (% change from BaU)
Scenario: COV Scenario: EPC
NTR WALRAS BWS NTR WALRAS BWS
AFR -2.07 17.04 0 -3.72 26.82 0
CHN -3.02 -1.08 0 -2.98 1.29 0
IDI 0.25 17.28 0 0.38 26.82 0
LAM -1.13 0.38 0 -2.12 1.54 0
MEA -3.07 2.56 0 -5.87 4.26 0
NAM -3.20 -2.68 -2.08 -9.62 -4.04 -2.61
PAO -1.46 -1.21 -0.78 -3.51 -1.61 -0.66
PAS -0.15 0.16 0 -0.24 1.07 0
REC -9.76 -8.82 -1.74 -19.36 -12.16 0
WEU -1.72 -1.40 -0.85 -4.34 -1.87 -0.62
WORLD -2.26 -0.99 -1.02 -5.65 -1.08 -1.04
ωi1(t) =
50− (t− 2000)
50
ωi1(2000) +
t− 2000
50
ωi1(2050). (7)
The total carbon limit for a country in a certain year is obtained by multiplying
the per capita emission rights by the country’s population in that year, which is
taken from exogenous population projections (United Nations 1996). Adding the
carbon limits across countries defines the global carbon limit.
The second entitlement allocation that we analyze is the equal per capita (EPC)
rule: the global carbon resource is distributed across regions in proportion to their
respective population. We impose the global emission trajectory of the scenario
COV also upon the scenario EPC to assure their consistent comparison.
We report the economic implications of alternative entitlement rules as com-
pared to a business-as-usual (BaU) reference where no emission constraints apply,
i.e. the shadow price on the global carbon resource (sink) is zero and there is no
need for dividing the ‘abundant’ fair division commodity. Table 3 summarizes the
inframarginal costs of the global emission constraint induced for scenarios COV and
EPC measured as a percentage of Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in lifetime in-
come. Note that damages from climate change are completely excluded from welfare
calculations.6
For each entitlement scenario we distinguish three cases. The case NTR re-
flects a regime where a country’s carbon emissions from domestic production and
consumption activities are restricted to its initial entitlements; thus there is no in-
ternational emission trading. The other two cases allow for trading but employ a
6Implicitly, we assume that they may be governed by a separate compensation solution.
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Figure 1: Carbon taxes under NTR for COV
different mechanism for the distribution of efficiency gains. These are the Walrasian
solution (WALRAS) and the bounded Walrasian solution (BWS).
5 Interpretation of results
Much of the debate on fair burden sharing in the climate change regime has focused
on the allocation of emission entitlements. Although this is certainly a central ques-
tion, the results of our simulations illustrate that other issues are equally important
for the size of emission abatement costs and their allocation across regions.
The first issue, which is relatively well known in the literature, is the tradability
of emission entitlements. In both scenarios, global abatement cost increase dra-
matically without trading due to the large differences in marginal abatement costs
across countries for the NTR case (see Figures 1 and 2). Furthermore, even de-
veloping countries that are not obliged to abate emissions under NTR – since their
entitlements exceed their demand – may face substantial welfare changes (see regions
AFR, MEA, and IDI in Table 3). The reason for this are spillovers via changes in
international prices, i.e. terms of trade effects that stem from economic adjustment
of other regions (Bo¨hringer and Rutherford 2001).
In this respect, the most important effect are changes on international fuel mar-
kets. The cutback in global demand for fossil fuels due to carbon emission con-
straints implies a significant drop of their prices, providing economic gains to fossil
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Figure 2: Carbon taxes under NTR for EPC
fuel importers and losses to fossil fuel exporters.
The economic implications of international price changes on non-energy markets
are more complex. Higher energy costs implied by carbon taxes raise prices of non-
energy goods (particularly energy-intensive goods) produced in abating countries.
Countries that import these goods suffer from higher prices to the extent that they
can not substitute away towards cheaper imports of non-abating countries. The
ease of substitution - captured by the Armington elasticity - not only determines
the implicit burden shifting of carbon taxes via non-energy exports from abating
countries, but also the extent to which non-abating countries achieve a competitive
advantage vis-a`-vis abating exporters.
The gain in market shares caused by substitution effects may be partially offset
by an opposite scale effect: Due to reduced economic activity and income effects,
import demand declines in the industrialized world, and this exerts a downward
pressure on the prices of developing country exports. On average, non-abating
regions or countries with very low carbon taxes gain comparative advantage on non-
energy markets. However, this may not be large enough to offset potentially negative
spillovers from international fuel markets.
These mechanisms explain why AFR and MEA, although not facing binding
emission constraints over the entire time span, experience significant welfare losses:
The imports of these countries become more expensive because of high abatement
costs in the supplier countries. In addition, reduced import demand by the indus-
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trialized world, where economic activity and income drops substantially, exerts a
downward pressure on the prices of exports from AFR and MEA (in particular,
revenues from fossil fuel exports decline). IDI, on the other hand, perceives terms-
of-trade gains, mainly due to reduced expenditure for fossil fuel imports. These
mechanisms also explain why most developing countries have a lower welfare in the
EPC scenario than in the COV scenario, although the former gives them a substan-
tially higher share of emission entitlements.
This picture changes fundamentally with the trading of carbon dioxide emissions
on competitive markets, as can be seen from the case WALRAS in Table 3. In
particular, those regions with no or only low carbon taxes under NTR benefit from
the huge additional income from their sales of emission rights (e.g. AFR, IDI, and
MEA). Under EPC all developing countries will even exceed their BaU welfare levels,
i.e. they benefit from global abatement.
This brings us to the second main finding, namely that the fair division of the
gains from exchanging entitlements has welfare implications that are as important
as the initial allocation of entitlements itself. In particular, supplementing the Wal-
rasian solution by the free access upper bound reduces the partly huge welfare
mentioned above. At the same time, it reduces the economic costs of industrialized
countries.
Nevertheless, developing countries are fully compensated for their abatement cost
with the Bounded Walrasian solution (BWS). Furthermore, the welfare induced by
BWS is similar in both scenarios, COV and EPC; maybe with the exception of
the reforming economy countries (REC).7 Of course, this is not the case for all
entitlement allocations. For example, with grandfathered emission rights, the upper
bound might not become binding, so that the Walrasian and the bounded Walrasian
solution would induce the same outcomes. Obviously, this outcome would be quite
different than the one with equal per capita emission rights.
Finally, we observe that welfare differences under COV and EPC are considerably
larger for the Walrasian solution than for the bounded Walrasian solution. This
again indicates that the importance of the entitlement allocations may actually have
been overemphasized as compared to the allocation of the gains from exchanging
these entitlements. If one agrees that the ethical judgements that underlie the
bounded Walrasian solution are less controversial than the fair allocation of initial
entitlements, this might actually help to facilitate the conflict on burden sharing in
climate change negotiations.
7The reason for this is that per capita income transfers under EPC are large enough to fully
compensate REC for its abatement costs (note that REC’s BaU income is relatively low compared
to other developed countries that also receive transfers).
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a solution for the fair division of common property
resources that supplements the Walrasian solution by lump-sum wealth transfers
to assure the adherence of lower and upper welfare bounds. For the two scenarios
that have been analyzed, this has substantial effects on the distribution of emis-
sion abatement costs. The bounded Walrasian solution entails the full participation
of developing countries in emission abatement efforts, but compensates them for
associated costs. At the same time, it reduces emission abatement costs for indus-
trialized countries, which would be moderate even for an instantaneous equal per
capita allocation of emission rights.
Interestingly, the full compensation of developing countries resembles the rules
of the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer, which has generally
been praised for its fairness (Benedick 1998). Even though our analysis has been
purely normative, this indicates that the proposed solution might actually not be so
quixotic after all. Nevertheless, the design of a mechanism for actually implementing
the proposed solution has not been addressed in this paper. This remains an open
area of further research.
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